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Abstract 
Climate change mitigation is a cross-cutting policy issue that requires coordination be-
tween policy departments and different levels of governance. However, the constitutional 
division of responsibilities (polity) and changing political constellations in government and 
society (politics) are constraining factors for achieving a horizontal climate policy integra-
tion and vertical coherence. This is especially the case in the federal system of Germany 
which is characterized by high degree of independence of departments and interdepend-
ence of the federal and subnational level.  
In recent years, integrated climate mitigation strategies were increasingly employed as a 
new governance mechanism to cope with the challenges of climate policy integration, co-
herence and long-term planning. This paper analyses and assesses the impact of three in-
tegrated climate mitigation strategies in Germany, namely the 2007 federal government’s 
“Integrated Energy and Climate Program” as well as regional strategies from Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hamburg. It shows that existing approaches especially at federal level 
so far lack important strategic elements that would ensure long-term impacts. Baden-
Wuerttemberg’s recently initiated strategy process might serve as a role model for other 
entities because it combines clear objectives and targets with institutional innovations, le-
gal codification and broad participation. The case studies demonstrate that effective 
strategies not only require ambitious and targets and measures, but also a continuous pro-
cess and dedicated strategic capacities. However, the impacts of strategies on actual poli-
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Climate change has acquired a top position on Germans governmental agendas in recent 
years. The relevance of a global temperature rise is hardly questioned, and there is broad 
agreement about the necessity of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the 
atmosphere. However, when it comes to the actual adoption and implementation of 
policies to achieve such a reduction, basic convictions clash against obstacles and barriers. 
There is a broad range of competing interests over adequate mechanisms to approach the 
problem. While some actors see a need for drastic and immediate transformation, others 
deny the priority of the matter vis-à-vis immediate issues such as employment or financial 
crisis that demand more urgent attention. Hence, short-term thinking often undermines 
long-term decision-making.  
Furthermore, institutional responsibilities for climate change mitigation are widely spread. 
Energy use and the level of GHG emissions from households, transport or business is 
determined or influenced by many different policy domains. As a result, several ministerial 
departments and different levels of governance, from the global to the local, have stakes 
in climate policymaking. Therefore, climate change mitigation implies a significant 
challenge for the current division of work between departments and levels of policy 
making. The political system is organized to represent the interests of relevant regional, 
sectoral and social groups in decision making. Mitigating climate change requires 
cooperation among the related organisations and actors and certainly affects their 
interests. In other words, effective and coherent climate policy can only be achieved 
through a high degree of climate policy integration (CPI) in everyday policymaking (Urwin 
& Jordan 2008, Mickwitz et al. 2009, Adelle & Russel 2013). The basic assumption of CPI is 
that the cross-sectoral and multi-level challenge of climate change requires the integration 
of climate concerns into non-environmental policy fields, and coherence of policy activities 
across different levels of government (Dupont, 2011). Adelle and Russel (2013) distinguish 
between three different ways of approaching CPI analytically: First, the concept of CPI 
implies a certain normative statement, postulating that (principled) priority should be 
assigned to climate policy objectives vis-à-vis other sectoral goals. Second, CPI can also be 
regarded as a process of governing which focuses on the development of a set of tools to 
ensure that climate-related policymaking and implementation processes integrate climate 
concerns across policy sectors (horizontally) and levels of government (vertically). Third 
and finally, CPI is being conceived as a policy output and outcome, e.g. with regard to the 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions avoided (outcome) by means of specific policies 
(output). This paper focuses on the governance dimension of CPI. We assuming that there 
is a political will for climate protection and are interested in the design of strategies for 
the implementation. Integrated strategies are conceived and analysed as a means for CPI. 
In recent years, policymakers have increasingly turned attention towards strategies as a 
new governance mechanism to address long-term challenges like sustainable development 
or climate change mitigation (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, forthcoming). Strategies aim to 
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define a given problem, identify requirements for action, set medium to long-term targets 
and develop a set of measures to achieve them. They are usually written down in 
documents that lay down objectives, instruments and implementation mechanisms 
(content dimension). Furthermore, they are processes with many different actors who take 
part in preparing, formulating, implementing and updating the strategy (process 
dimension). Finally, strategic capacity is an integral part of strategies. This includes the 
creation of a knowledge base about the given problem and its causes and effects, the 
establishment of a network of supporters, the opportunity to set the agenda and influence 
political processes, and the development of communication channels and formats (capacity 
dimension) (Jacob et al. 2012). These three dimensions of strategies (content, processes 
and capacities) form the analytical framework for our analysis of climate strategies. 
Strategies are conceived as a as a mean to overcome the described barriers to integration. 
Rather than representing yet another policy document, they are supposed to initiate 
comprehensive governing processes suitable for tackling long-term and large-scale problem 
contexts (Rayner & Howlett 2009).  
German governments have shown particular effort to pioneer in climate change mitigation 
since the late 1980s (Weidner & Mez 2008). While urging for an effective international 
climate regime, they have agreed upon ambitious targets and measures domestically. 
However, CPI is confronted with a number of challenges in Germany (Michaelowa 2008). 
These stem from the federal state structure that guarantees a certain degree of autonomy 
and co-decision power to the regional entities (Länder), the necessity to form coalition 
governments among competing parties, the fact that German governments operate on the 
basis of the departmental principle, thereby allowing a great amount of leeway for single 
ministries to shape the configuration of policies under their responsibility, and the 
frequency of elections on either federal or regional level that are scattered throughout the 
year. Given the various structural, procedural and political barriers, scholars have 
concluded that Germany’s capacity for policy integration is “poor” (Jordan & Lenschow, 
2010, p. 150), and that policymaking is usually dominated by “negative coordination” 
(Scharpf 1972, Fleischer & Hustedt 2012, p. 265). 
This paper assesses climate mitigation strategies at federal and regional level, asking 
whether these governance approaches were so far able to overcome the barriers to climate 
policy integration, coherence and long-term focus. Given the federal state structure and 
the division of ministerial responsibilities (polity) as well as changing political 
constellations in government and society (politics), this article is guided by the following 
research question: Are integrated strategies an effective means to cope with the 
challenges of climate policy integration, coherence and long-term orientation? 
In order to answer the research question, a comparative analysis of three climate 
mitigation strategies was conducted. At federal level, the 2007 “Integrated Energy and 
Climate Program” (IEKP) is scrutinized. For Germany, it represents the most 




so far (Hierl 2011). At sub national level, case studies on climate policy activities in the 
Länder Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hamburg were selected because of their pioneering role 
in climate protection over the last decades. In Germany, the Länder are responsible not 
only for the implementation of national legislation, but in many policy domains can 
develop own standards and programs. For instance, both have passed provincial legislation 
to achieve GHG emissions reductions in the buildings sector that goes far beyond federal 
provisions (Jacob & Kannen, 2015). The empirical analysis is based on comprehensive desk 
research and 23 semi-structured expert interviews (see annex for a list of interviewees). 
Experts were chosen on the basis of their involvement in the policy processes to be 
analysed. They are affiliated with federal or Länder ministries, political parties, non-
government organizations or advisory bodies. 
The article is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of challenges 
for achieving a horizontal CPI in the relevant policy domains and a vertical coherence of 
climate policies across the different levels in Germany so as to gain a picture of the 
structural and political context in which strategies operate. This is followed by a 
description of attempts to implement a climate mitigation strategy at the federal level and 
in the Länder Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hamburg. A subsequent discussion outlines a 
number of strategic elements that could potentially enhance coherence and long-term 
focus in German climate policy.  
 
2 Challenges for an effective and coherent climate policy in Germany 
It is a characteristic of German climate policies that a national consensus emerged from 
the 1980s on the need to combat climate change (Weidner & Mez 2008). Discussions subse-
quently focused on concrete GHG reduction goals and strategies. The first reduction goal 
of 25 percent by 2005 compared to 1987 was set in 1990. In 1995, the target’s base year 
was changed to 1990. These goals provided a strong impetus for the international climate 
change agenda and the foundation for Germany’s self-claimed leadership position (Jänicke 
2011). Within the framework of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the related EU Burden Sharing 
Agreement, Germany, together with Denmark (-21%) and Luxemburg  (-28%) was among the 
most ambitious EU Member States and committed to a 21 percent reduction of GHG by 
2008-12 relative to 1990 levels. This target was already achieved in 2007. Partly, this was a 
result of the so called wall-fall profits: The transformation of the eastern German energy 
sector and industry after reunification resulted in an enormous decline of GHG emissions. 
It is estimated that about 100 Mt (i.e. ca. 50%) of the reduction can be attributed to this 
(Eichhammer et al. 2001). Currently, Germany aims at reducing GHG emissions by 40 per-
cent in 2020 and at least 80 percent by 2050 compared to 1990 (BMWi & BMU 2010).  
Despite widespread agreement on the need for action, concrete measures to achieve the 
self-set targets were oftentimes discussed controversially. The result is an incremental, 
sectorally fragmented implementation of targets (Beck et al. 2009). Even though changes 
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in government constellations did not make a great difference to the overall direction of 
climate policy, the preferences for specific instruments, and the willingness to burden the 
economy and society in order to protect the climate varied significantly. For instance, so-
cial and economic concerns gained importance after German reunification under the Con-
servative-Liberal government led by Chancellor Kohl, while environmental issues became 
more prominent after the election of a Social Democrat-Green coalition government in 
1998 (Michaelowa 2008, Jänicke 2011). 
Today’s German climate mitigation policy is marked by a great variety of policy instru-
ments. These range from regulatory requirements (e.g. minimum efficiency standards and 
mandatory use of heat from renewable energies in newly constructed buildings) and eco-
nomic incentives (e.g. ecological tax reform, emissions trading, feed-in tariff for renewa-
ble electricity, subsidies for energy efficiency measures) to voluntary agreements with in-
dustry and awareness-raising campaigns (Weidner & Mez 2008). Overall, subsequent gov-
ernment coalitions have put a great emphasis on the economic advantages that result from 
the development of environmental and climate-friendly technologies. Climate change poli-
cy could be legitimized by economic success stories and hence further ensure public and 
industry support (Jänicke 2011). Nevertheless, effective and coherent climate policy is 
faced with a number of challenges on the horizontal and vertical dimension. In the follow-
ing, these challenges are described in more detail, with a special focus on the political sys-
tem and the governance practices it prescribes. 
2.1 Horizontal CPI: departmental egoism and the challenge of coordination  
Due to the cross-sectoral nature of climate change mitigation, eight ministries have re-
sponsibilities in this field. Overall responsibility for climate change and renewable energy 
rests with the Ministry of Environment (BMU)1. The Ministry of Economics (BMWi) coordi-
nates energy policy; the Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (BMVBS) is re-
sponsible for targeting GHG emissions in the transport and buildings sector; and the Minis-
try of Agriculture (BMELV) deals with agricultural emissions. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Finance (BMF) decides on the provision of financial resources for climate protection 
measures, the Ministry of Education and Research (BMFB) grants funding for research activ-
ities, and the Foreign Office (AA) and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (BMZ) are concerned with international climate policy. Each of the ministries has set 
up so-called “mirror units” that keep track of environmental policy activities. While one 
might suspect that the installation of mirror units represents a step towards integration, 
                                            
 
1 The empirical study was undertaken before the election and the reshuffling of governmental responsibilities 
end of 2013. Therefore, we keep the former denominations of departments. Although there has been a fun-
damental reorganization of responsibilities and in particular a concentration of energy related responsibili-




Wurzel (2008) demonstrates that they are rather a means of control, making sure that non-
environmental interests are equally taken into account. 
This is partly a result of the German polity: Article 65 of the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz) establishes three principles that constitute the basis of cooperation within 
the Federal Executive. First, the “chancellor principle” implies that general policy guide-
lines are determined by the Chancellor. Second, the “departmental principle” establishes 
sole responsibility of ministers for decisions taken within their realm of authority, thus im-
plying a strong role to single ministries within their portfolio. Third and finally, the “cabi-
net principle” requires that disagreements between ministries are settled within the Cabi-
net. In reality, however, these principles are not perfectly balanced. While the chancellor 
principle has proved to be nearly irrelevant in light of a chancellor’s dependence on his or 
her coalition party and his or her party’s parliamentary group, the fulfilment of the cabi-
net principle is highly dependent on a harmonious coalition willing to rationally dissolve 
tensions between single ministers. Mayntz and Scharpf (1975) have revealed structural 
constraints in the German federal executive that lead to “negative coordination” patterns, 
i.e. decision-making based on the lowest common denominator. A turf war mentality in 
ministerial departments and an unwillingness in the Cabinet to constructively discuss the 
issues at stake frequently results in modest policy change or even political stalemate 
(Fleischer & Hustedt 2012).  
Differing problem perceptions and policy goals are particularly evident between BMU and 
BMWi. As one interviewee put it, the two ministries “have diametrically opposed regulato-
ry ideas, interests, cultural identities, and usually also party political affiliations”. Differ-
ent stakeholders and considerations inform strategic decisions. While the BMU is concerned 
about environmental and climate protection, the BMWi’s main goals are economic growth, 
cost efficiency and job creation. Therefore, it frequently rejects climate protection 
measures perceived as too constraining for industry (Michaelowa 2008). 
Besides the polity, competing parties which form coalition agreement play a role: Their 
different views and opinions in the Cabinet have substantial implications for German cli-
mate policy. An illustrative example is the 2012 disagreement over Germany’s position on 
the EU Energy Efficiency Directive that was only solved after several months of open con-
flict between the liberal Economics Minister and the Christian democratic Environment 
Minister (EurActiv 2012). But differing perceptions do not only culminate in discussions on 
single measures. Notwithstanding the achievements in climate protection over the last 
decades, continuous discussions about competitive disadvantages and other constraints 
from environmental legislation have led to a certain degree of incoherence in German pol-
icies. Eco-tax exemptions for energy-intensive companies, environmentally harmful subsi-
dies for coal-fired power plants and the absence of a general speed limit on German high-
ways are just a few examples of Germany’s ambivalent policy mix (Bär et al. 2011, Jänicke 
2011). 
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In an attempt to increase coherence in German climate policy, an Inter-ministerial Working 
Group on CO2 Reduction (IMA CO2) was set up in 1990. IMA CO2 was supposed to provide 
recommendations for the future direction of climate policy. Its configuration reflects the 
cross-cutting nature of the issue: While the IMA was chaired by the environmental ministry, 
several subgroups responsible for analysing GHG reduction potentials in particular issue ar-
eas were led by the respective line ministry. The fragmentation of responsibilities, howev-
er, complicated the process of decision-making. Several conflicts between ministry repre-
sentatives impeded mutual problem-solving. As a result, IMA CO2 reports were criticized 
for their vague and at times inconsistent recommendations (Fleischer & Hustedt 2012). 
Even though IMA CO2 was not formally abandoned, it has been inactive since 2007. One of 
our interviewees suspects that it “petered out at the political level” when conflicts could 
no longer be dealt with constructively at the working level. Despite some initial successes 
in fostering policy integration (Beck et al. 2009), the eventual fate of IMA CO2 illustrates 
the German government’s limited capacity to overcome departmental conflicts. 
 
2.2 Vertical dimension: implications of a federal state structure 
Coherent climate policy is further complicated by the fact that respective responsibilities 
are fragmented vertically. This is especially the case in federal countries (Galarraga et al. 
2011) such as Germany. The German federation consists of 16 semi-autonomous states 
(Länder), each having its own constitution, parliament and government. Even though most 
climate-related policies are adopted at the federal level, Länder may engage in climate 
mitigation policy in three different ways (Rodi & Sina 2011). According to the constitution, 
state representatives in the second chamber (Bundesrat) have to approve all federal legis-
lation affecting their financial and administrative matters. This makes the Länder an im-
portant veto-player in federal policymaking. Furthermore, Länder are responsible for exe-
cuting and enforcing most federal legislation. Finally, they can take own action with re-
gard to certain aspects of climate change mitigation. Beyond federal legislation, Länder 
may adopt additional provisions in fields that are not exhaustively regulated on federal 
level. In addition, they have (albeit not exclusive) competences in construction, land-use 
and urban planning as well as in training and education, they can initiate pilot projects, 
engage in research promotion, establish funding programs, conclude voluntary agreements 
with domestic industry, and act as role model by enhancing the energy performance of 
state-owned buildings or by adopting a climate-friendly procurement policy (Biedermann 
2011).  
What are the consequences of the division of competencies in climate change mitigation? 
While the regions have a say in federal policymaking, the federal government has very lim-
ited means to influence policy activities on the regional level. Since no institutional 
framework requires coordination or cooperation, it depends on the policy priorities of the 
Länder whether and to what extent they engage in climate change mitigation (Rodi & Sina 




climate change impacts on the region, the overall governmental agenda, party politics, or 
personal preferences of a prime minister. Federal proceedings, on the other hand, seem to 
play only a minor role. In this context it should be added that most states have very lim-
ited financial and administrative capacities for climate protection measures because the 
so-called “debt ceiling” constitutionally requires a balanced budget by 2020.  
Our interviews reveal that the distribution of competencies has both positive and negative 
consequences for climate change mitigation. On the positive side, some Länder compete 
over the most ambitious reduction targets for climate protection. Furthermore, federalism 
has proved to be a driver of Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) because regions 
find it to be in their self-interest to promote renewable energy generation on their territo-
ry. In this regard, they have supported the development of renewable energies already in 
the 1980s well before the federal level started to act (Gordon et al., 2010). On the nega-
tive side, however Länder suffer from a lack of financial and administrative resources to 
implement federal regulatory provisions, e.g. in the building sector (Ziehm 2010). In addi-
tion, Länder are able to block the adoption of federal policies in the Bundesrat. For in-
stance, in December 2012 the Bundesrat vetoed a bill on the tax deductibility of building 
refurbishments. Even though the great majority of politicians and experts agree on the ef-
fectiveness of the instrument, partisan considerations and concerns about revenue losses 
led to the rejection of the bill by social democrat-led governments. Finally, the lack of in-
stitutionalized coordination between federal and regional activities sometimes leads to a 
“regulatory jungle” that confuses the addressees of regulation. In 2007, for instance, the 
BMU published an overview of funding possibilities for energy efficiency improvements and 
renewable energy. The publication lists more than 900 funding programs financed by the 
European Union (EU), the federal government, states and municipalities (BMU 2007). 
There is a certain parallelism between federal and Länder activities that sometimes leads 
to sub-optimal outcomes. However, this is not to say that coordination does not exist. 
Federal and Länder representatives frequently meet to discuss relevant topics, for instance 
in the context of the biannual Conference of Environment Ministers (UMK), within issue-
specific working groups (Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppen), or on sporadic, issue-specific meet-
ings on political level. Yet, concrete decisions are rare when 16 states and the federal 
government negotiate, given the various party-political compositions of governments and 
the heterogeneity of states with regard to population, finances and expected impacts of 
policies. In addition to these formal and informal meetings that are usually concerned with 
rather general political questions, state administrations are consulted by federal ministries 
when legislation is drafted. However, the deepness of cooperation depends on the respec-
tive ministry’s openness for input. One interviewee pointed to the formalism of these 
meetings, which are more about allocating institutional responsibilities than about ex-
changing ideas and problem solving. Another interviewee complains about state admin-
istrations’ lack of influence in these meetings for which he uses the term “unilateral coop-
eration”. 
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The overview shows that climate policy integration, coherence and long-term orientation 
are challenges that arise in a context of hampering institutional and political conditions, 
both on the horizontal and vertical axes of governance. Are strategies a means to over-
come this and to effectively promote integration and coherence of climate policies? 
 
3 Federal and regional climate mitigation strategies in Germany 
3.1 Federal climate mitigation strategy 2007 
Germany looks back at almost twenty-five years of climate mitigation strategies. The first 
strategy (“CO2 Reduction Program”) was adopted as early as 1990 under the Kohl admin-
istration. It was up-dated and extended under the Schröder administration in 2000 and 
2005 (“Climate Protection Pro-grams”). These strategy updates were compiled in order to 
achieve Germany’s Kyoto target, i.e. a 21 percent reduction of GHG emissions by 2008-
2012. Detached from international commitments, the Grand Coalition under Chancellor 
Angela Merkel adopted a new strategy in 2007. The “Integrated Energy and Climate Pro-
gram” (IEKP) constitutes the German government’s most comprehensive attempt to im-
plement an integrated strategy for climate change mitigation so far (Hierl 2011, p. 67).  
What were the reasons for Germany’s the updated strategy in 2007? As one interviewee 
put it, a “critical mass of external occasions and events” led to a window of opportunity 
for ambitious climate protection. Increased international attention to the issue of climate 
change was triggered by the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 and the IPCC’s 4th As-
sessment Report in 2007, both calling for immediate action in the fight against climate 
change (IPCC 2007, Stern 2007). At the same time, the fate of the international climate 
regime was uncertain as negotiations on a post-Kyoto agreement were stagnating. In this 
context, both Chancellor Merkel (CDU) and then Environment Minister Gabriel (SPD) were 
eager to push through ambitious climate mitigation programs at EU and national level so as 
to point the way forward for international developments. Their approach was backed by 
the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag 2006), by Environment Ministers of the Länder (Um-
weltministerkonferenz 2007), and by the general public (Itzenplitz 2012, p. 174). Thus, the 
IEKP, announced in August 2007 and adopted in two steps in December 2007 and June 
2008, has to be considered in the wider international context and Germany’s desire to 
maintain its reputation as climate change mitigation forerunner. 
In the IEKP Germany commits for a 40 percent GHG reduction target until 2020 compared 
to 1990. To achieve this, it pursues a threefold approach: increasing energy efficiency, es-
pecially in buildings and transport; expanding renewable energies in electricity, heating, 
cooling and transport; and reducing non-CO2 emissions (BMU 2008, p. 2). In addition to the 
rather general GHG reduction target, the IEKP contains a number of sectoral goals for 
2020, for instance increasing the share of electricity generated by renewables to 25-30 




of combined heat and power plants. Interim targets on the path to 2020 were however not 
included.  
In essence, the IEKP is an action program with 29 specific measures that are supposed to 
jointly achieve a 36 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990. There-
by, the program went considerably beyond the 21 percent reduction achieved until 2007, 
however a gap remained to achieve the objective of a 40 percent reduction (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2007, p. 65, Hierl 2011, p. 77). The remaining gap should be closed by addition-
al measures not yet defined. Already until 2009, all 29 measures were implemented 
through laws, regulations or funding schemes (UBA 2011). This indicates that a number of 
measures were either already in place and only modified or reinforced (e.g. Combined 
Heat and Power Act, Renewable Energies Act, subsidies for energetic renovation of build-
ings), or would have been introduced anyway because of EU legislation (e.g. regulatory re-
quirements for biofuels, newly constructed buildings and carbon capture and storage). 
Therefore, it is hardly possible to attribute a specific impact of the strategy.  
What was new about the IEKP was the assignment of responsibility for each of the 29 
measures to a respective line ministry. The idea was that every sector would have to con-
tribute to the overall climate mitigation target, irrespective of potential conflicts with 
other sectoral targets. However, this approach led to suboptimal outcomes. While the ini-
tial IEKP document was drafted by the BMU, its provisions were subsequently weakened in 
the legislative process. Derogations and exceptions for influential lobby groups like energy 
companies or car manufacturers were introduced. Already in 2008, the German Advisory 
Council on the Environment criticized the IEKP’s inadequacy for meeting the 2020 target 
(SRU 2008, p. 107 ff.). Thus, the IEKP was not spared from the known conflicts between 
BMU on the one hand, and BMWi, BMVBS and BMELV on the other (Hierl 2011, p. 88). The 
chosen way of proceeding proved to be a gateway for the latter ministries to pursue sec-
tor-specific interests without openly questioning the strategy as such (cf. interviews and 
Itzenplitz 2012, p. 199). The legislative process preceding the adoption of a Renewable 
Energy Heat Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Wärmegesetz, EEWärmeG) is an illustrative exam-
ple. Mandatory standards for heat from renewable energies in newly constructed as well as 
existing buildings were announced in the BMU’s IEKP draft. However, subsequent negotia-
tions between departments and coalition parties were tough. While BMU and Social Demo-
crats pushed for demanding standards, BMWi, BMVBS and Conservatives were eager to en-
sure economic viability and respect to property rights. The main issue of conflict was the 
question of whether standards for existing buildings should be included in the law. For the 
sake of agreement, and through mediation of the Chancellery, this contentious point was 
decided in favor of the less ambitious approach – mandatory country-wide standards now 
only apply to newly constructed buildings, but not to existing ones (Bruns et al. 2009, Hierl 
2011, p. 459). As a result, EEWärmeG is being criticized for being the “weakest element” 
of the IEKP (Futterlieb 2011, p. 88). 
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A dedicated governance mechanism for the development and implementation of the IEKP 
was not discussed. On the contrary, the chosen way of implementing the strategy’s action 
plan was based on the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (Gemeinsame 
Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien), according to which responsibility for a policy is 
assigned to a lead ministry whose task is to involve other affected departments and stake-
holders in the legislative process. There was neither a coordination unit for the whole IEKP 
nor a predetermined standard for third party involvement. The responsibilities for drafting 
and implementing the 29 measures were assigned to the different ministries, but other 
cross cutting responsibilities were not explicitly assigned. For instance, the strategy docu-
ment stipulates that the IEKP should be subject to periodical monitoring. Its first evalua-
tion was scheduled for November 2010 and then every two years thereafter. However, un-
til today the IEKP has never been monitored or deliberately updated, presumably because 
the new conservative-liberal government felt less committed to the strategy while pursu-
ing its own policy priorities. It rejected an “isolated monitoring” of the IEKP while refer-
ring to reports on the status of the German Energiewende (Deutscher Bundestag 2012, p. 
5).  
The absence of a clear responsibility for monitoring and evaluating the strategy helps to 
understand why the IEKP’s impact significantly lost momentum after the 2009 change of 
government and an associated shift in political priorities. A number of interviewees com-
plain that Chancellor Merkel’s position has changed from climate mitigation forerunner to 
opponent of ambitious climate policies. All interviewees agree that the IEKP is not an issue 
in current politics any more, although its provisions are still in place. Overall, the IEKP did 
not break open existing governance structures and therefore failed to meet the expecta-
tions to achieve a comprehensive CPI. While it was certainly a step forward with regard to 
the formulation of objectives, goals and instruments, it was rather weak with regard to 
process and capacity. Neither did it assign clear responsibility for monitoring and updating 
(process), nor did it manage to establish a coordinating network within the federal execu-
tive and beyond (capacities).  
By 2012, German GHG emissions were about 23.8 percent below 1990 levels (UBA 2014). 
Although there was a slight increase in emissions compared to 2011 these figures are im-
pressive in international comparison. Yet, the analysis sheds doubts on whether they are 
the result of a comprehensive strategic process that managed to increase the degree of CPI 
in Germany. The feasibility of ambitious climate policies in 2007 was rather the result of a 
set of favourable contextual circumstances, e.g. an increased awareness of the need to 
combat climate change, an international agenda on which the issue acquired a top posi-
tion, progressive leaders in German government convinced about the need for action and 
able to assert themselves, and an already existing path towards renewable energy promo-
tion that was initiated by earlier governments and widely supported by the general public. 
The did not manage to change existing priorities in non-environmental departments, and it 




becomes an ongoing task in ministries other than the BMU. As a result, commitment to the 
strategy and its objectives faded quickly after the 2009 federal election. Thus, one can 
conclude that the IEKP did not represent a new and innovative governance mechanism to 
sustainably enhance horizontal CPI in Germany. It was rather a package of measures for 
climate change mitigation that could be adopted in times of fortunate external circum-
stances and leadership. 
While horizontal CPI could therefore not be sustainably enhanced by the IEKP, this was not 
even attempted for vertical CPI or coherence. The Länder role in the strategy process was 
marginal. Even though federal and state governments jointly declared their willingness to 
pursue demanding national and EU climate targets (Umweltministerkonferenz 2007), the 
Länder were not involved in conceptualizing or negotiating the IEKP. Their role was limited 
to approving legislative acts in the Bundesrat (see also BLAG KliNa 2010). Being a purely 
federal strategy, the IEKP could neither set requirements for action at Länder level nor de-
fine regional targets. The parallelism between federal and regional activities was hence 
sustained and there is no coordination of subnational climate policies. 
 
3.2 Regional climate mitigation strategies 
Länder efforts in climate change mitigation vary significantly. Most Länder have adopted 
GHG reduction targets, strategies and measures without coordination from the federal lev-
el. The approaches, however differ in substance, level of detail and bindingness (Bieder-
mann 2011). In January 2013, North Rhine-Westphalia was the first state to adopt a cli-
mate protection law, thereby legally setting GHG reduction targets and planning their im-
plementation (Nordrhein-Westfalen 2013). Many states, albeit not all, have set up energy 
agencies which, according to one interviewee, are important actors for anchoring climate 
protection at municipal and individual levels. The following section briefly depicts two dif-
fering approaches to regional climate policy that were initiated independently from feder-
al proceedings. 
 
3.2.1 Baden-Wuerttemberg: institutionalization & codification 
With more than ten million residents and a surface area over 35,000 km2, Baden-
Wuerttemberg is one of the largest German states. It is marked by above-average econom-
ic strength and household income (AEE 2012, p. 40). Between 1953 and 2011, Baden-
Wuerttemberg was led by conservative minister presidents who sometimes formed coali-
tions with Liberals or Social Democrats. In May 2011, however, political majorities turned 
around and the Green party won the largest number of seats. Baden-Wuerttemberg is cur-
rently the first and only state that is governed by a green-red coalition under a green Min-
ister President. 
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However, already before this took place, Baden-Wuerttemberg was perceived an environ-
mental forerunner. Its first climate mitigation strategy dates back to 1994 when awareness 
raising and advisory services were the main foci. In the course of time, Baden-
Wuerttemberg has further developed and refined its climate policy activities by means of 
environmental plans, provincial legislation, and efforts to influence federal climate poli-
cymaking. A centrepiece of its endeavours is the Renewable Heat Act (Erneuerbare-
Wärme-Gesetz, EWärmeG) adopted in 2007, which mandatorily obliges homeowners to de-
ploy heat from renewable sources in existing and newly built houses. Until today, Baden-
Wuerttemberg is the only German state that legally prescribes the use of renewable heat 
in existing buildings. 
Since the election of the green-red government coalition in 2011, climate policy activities 
have gathered even more momentum. The new government is determined to implement a 
long-term strategy that proves robust in the face of future resistance or crisis situations. 
The strategy goes certainly beyond a policy document and develops strategic capacities 
and processes. Based on experience with former processes of coordination and planning, it 
has pooled responsibilities for environmental, climate and energy matters in one depart-
ment, thereby minimizing frictions. Baden-Wuerttemberg’s climate mitigation strategy is 
based upon two pillars. First, a climate protection law was adopted in July 2013. It defines 
GHG reduction targets for 2020 and 2050 (-25% and -90%, respectively) and clarifies that 
they should be achieved by means of an implementation concept and an exemplary role of 
the public sector. According to our interviewees, the climate protection law entails a 
strong moral self-commitment of the state. Even though targets are not legally binding in 
the sense that they are enforceable before a court, dissociation from them in the future is 
made extremely difficult, particularly since it was adopted by the three biggest fractions 
in parliament (Greens, Social Democrats and Conservatives). In essence, the law’s aim is to 
enhance the reliability of long-term concepts for the economy and the public in general. 
Second, an “Integrated Energy and Climate Protection Concept” (IEKK) is currently being 
developed. The IEKK comprises sectoral targets and defines specific steps of action in vari-
ous climate-related sectors like energy supply, industry, transportation, agriculture, or 
private households. Its adoption is legally prescribed by the climate protection law. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg breaks new ground with regard to the inclusiveness of its strategy 
process. While responsibility for IEKK formulation rests with the Ministry of Environment, 
Climate and Energy, an inter-ministerial working group facilitates coordination with other 
ministries. In addition, a comprehensive process of participation has been initiated that in-
volves a great variety of stakeholders, from industry groups to the ordinary citizen. Besides 
the statutory hearing of associations, topic-specific round tables were organized that re-




sultation yielded more than 82,000 assessments of measures and almost 7,0002 comments . 
According to our interviewees, this participation process occupied substantial resources, 
but will presumably exert a legitimizing effect once the IEKK is being implemented. They 
argue that participation in early conceptual phases of strategy development forestalls con-
flicts that arise at later stages when concrete burdens have to be accepted.  
An additional means to ensure the robustness of Baden-Wuerttemberg’s strategy process is 
the creation of institutions for effective monitoring and updating. A coordination center 
for climate issues (Leitstelle Klimaschutz, LSK) will be installed. The LSK will have the task 
to monitor implementation of sector-specific measures by the responsible ministries. 
Equipped with information rights, it will be the central unit for IEKK implementation and 
monitoring. The LSK will be supported by a newly assembled Advisory Council on Climate 
Protection. The Advisory Council is composed of actors from society, industry and academ-
ia who will have the task to critically assess the state’s climate policy activities and pro-
vide suggestions for further progress. 
At present, Baden-Wuerttemberg’s new path towards strategy development cannot be 
evaluated on the basis of successes in terms of avoided GHG emissions or the like. Howev-
er, the combination of institutionalization and jurisdification appears promising to ensure 
strategy robustness in the long term. In contrast to the federal IEKP, Baden-Wuerttemberg 
attempts to combine objectives, goals and instruments for climate change mitigation with 
the involvement of all actors relevant to the strategy’s success (affected departments, ex-
perts, interest groups and citizens) and the creation of strategic capacity (pooled responsi-
bility in one department; institutions for monitoring and updating; legally binding com-
mitments in the climate protection law). 
 
3.2.2 Hamburg: A pragmatic approach based on regular performance reviews 
With 1.8 million residents, the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg is the second-largest 
city in Germany and at the same time the second-smallest German state. Known particu-
larly for its port, but also as a media and industrial center, Hamburg is an economically 
prosperous urban area (AEE 2012, p. 80). Between 1957 and 2001, it was governed by So-
cial Democrats, at times in coalitions with Liberals or Greens. In 2001, conservative Mayor 
Ole von Beust won the elections and his party ruled until 2011 in three different coalition 
constellations. In 2011, the Social Democrats took over again with a one party government 
led by Mayor Olaf Scholz. The following section deals with Hamburg’s Climate Action Plan 
2007-2012, which represents a different approach to climate policymaking at regional level 
than the one chosen by Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
                                            
 
2 See http://www.beko.baden-wuerttemberg.de/ergebnisse/. 
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In 2007, Major von Beust got convinced that Hamburg had to strengthen its efforts to re-
duce GHG emissions. Word is that von Beust watched the documentary film An Inconven-
ient Truth over the winter holidays. Returning back to work, von Beust initiated a climate 
change concept that avoids as many GHG emissions as possible in the years to come. With-
in two months, the Climate Action Plan 2007-2012 was drafted. It took a pragmatic ap-
proach: The Action Plan was essentially a funding mechanism for energy saving and climate 
mitigation projects. Its aim was to avoid 2 million tons of CO2 emissions (ca. 11%) until 
2012 compared to 2007. Endowed with budgetary means of 25 million Euros annually, more 
than 400 projects were funded within the five-year period. The project list includes, inter 
alia, awareness raising campaigns, training and qualification programs, and funding for the 
reduction of energy consumption in industry, transportation and buildings. The Action Plan 
explicitly refers to federal level activities for target achievement. According to the calcu-
lation, at least one fifth of Hamburg’s stated GHG reduction target would have to result 
from federal provisions like legislative acts, fiscal steering, or funding measures (Ham-
burger Bürgerschaft 2007, p. 9). 
In order to coordinate implementation and updating of the Climate Action Plan, an inter-
departmental coordination center (Leitstelle Klimaschutz, LSK) was established. Although 
formally tied to the environmental authority3, the LSK was supposed to work independently 
from depart-mental instructions. It was responsible for the coordination of an interde-
partmental working group and the annual submission of a climate protection report that 
includes an overview of funded projects and proposals for further action. Even with these 
limited responsibilities, according to our interviewees, the LSK was conceived as a power-
ful, but also at times unpopular entity because it aimed to correct self-serving interests in 
non-environmental sectors and caused extra workload through reporting requirements.  
Our interviewees estimate that the Climate Action Plan has slightly increased climate pro-
tection efforts in Hamburg’s non-environmental authorities during the period of time for 
which it was established. However, this was mainly due to the fact that they could apply 
for funds from the budget, and not because of a change in general guidelines. The ap-
proach as such is being praised for its pragmatism, i.e. avoiding CO2 emissions in a cost-
efficient manner. However, interviewees agree that the Climate Action Plan 2007-2012 is 
not a strategy in the most literal sense. It particularly lacks a long-term vision and a plan 
of how to fulfil it. The Action Plan represents a stringing together of single projects, but it 
is not an integrated concept that identifies priority fields of action. On the other hand, it 
proved successful in reaching its stated target, namely reducing Hamburg’s annual GHG 
emissions by 2 million tons until 2012 compared to 2007 (Hamburg.de 2013). 
                                            
 




Overall, Hamburg’s approach differed substantially from the federal and Baden-
Wuerttemberg strategy. While strategic capacity was ensured by a significant budget for 
climate and energy-related projects and the establishment of a coordination unit (LSK) re-
sponsible for implementation and monitoring, the other strategy dimensions (process and 
document) are less pronounced. With its Climate Action Plan 2007-2012, Hamburg neither 
developed a long-term, post-2012 vision or a strategic plan for how to achieve this, nor did 
it put emphasis on the involvement of actors outside the public administration. Neither the 
political level nor non-governmental stakeholder were involved in the strategy process. 
 
4 Comparative analysis 
The empirical analysis shows that the federal government and the states of Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hamburg have chosen very different approaches in the formulation and 
implementation of their climate mitigation strategies. It appears as if only Baden-
Wuerttemberg has managed to design a comprehensive strategy that combines the three 
dimensions “content”, “process”, and “capacity”.  Although it is too early to evaluate the 
effects of this approach, former coordination barriers were presumably removed through 
the pooling of responsibilities for environment, climate and energy matters in one depart-
ment. Furthermore, Baden-Wuerttemberg decided to enshrine its targets and strategy el-
ements into law so as to ensure long-term planning and commitment. Finally, participation 
plays a central role in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The decision for a comprehensive participa-
tion process for interest groups, associations and ordinary citizens was informed by the be-
lief that involvement and resulting support is essential for the legitimacy of a strategy and 
its resulting policies.  
The federal IEKP, on the other hand, did not manage to overcome the diametrically op-
posed interests of BMU on the one hand, and BMWi, BMVBS and BMELV on the other. Dedi-
cated institutional settings were not established so as to enhance coordination and mutual 
problem-solving. Further-more, participation on the strategy itself did not take place. As a 
statutory requirement, only legislative proposals as part of the action plan were subject to 
the hearing of stakeholders. Finally, strategic capacity was insufficient to initiate a con-
tinuous strategy process that survives changes in government constellation. Therefore, af-
ter the 2009 election, the IEKP did not play a central role in federal climate policy activi-
ties any more. The fact that the IEKP has never been monitored, despite a clear intention 
in the strategy document, is an illustrative example for its fading support. 
In Hamburg, horizontal CPI is equally at a low level. However, the availability of a signifi-
cant budget as part of the Climate Action Plan 2007-2012 led to a slightly enhanced inter-
est in non-environmental authorities to carry out projects in the area of climate change 
mitigation. The Climate Action Plan managed to achieve its target of reducing Hamburg’s 
annual GHG emissions by 2 million tons, but it is not a strategy in the sense that it provides 
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long-term orientation, initiates comprehensive governing processes and overcomes existing 
barriers to climate policy integration. 
Three further observations can be made: First, vertical CPI is fairly detached from strategy 
processes so far. IEKP formulation happened without any Länder involvement, and the final 
document does not touch upon the issue of vertical coordination – although it does point to 
the need for action at every level of governance. Strategy formulation at regional level, on 
the other hand, takes place without any involvement from federal actors. Even though 
federal provisions and funding are regarded essential for target achievement, strategies do 
not aim at altering the current state of affairs, i.e. parallelism of activities between the 
two levels. On the whole, interviewees were sceptical about the integrating effect of ex-
isting coordination patterns, both in the context of strategies and beyond. From the Län-
der perspective, they are perceived as ineffective because suggestions are barely taken in-
to account.  
Second, strategies essentially depend on political leadership and commitment to be effec-
tive. This was the case with Chancellor Merkel and Environment Minister Gabriel in the 
IEKP process, Minister President Kretschmann in Baden-Wuerttemberg’s intensified efforts 
after 2011, and Mayor von Beust’s initiation of Hamburg’s Climate Action Plan 2007-2012.  
Third and finally, the commitment to strategies is thus far limited to a legislative period. 
In all three cases, existing strategies were either terminated or ignored when new govern-
ments with different priorities and, more importantly, party political background took 
over. This does not necessarily imply a complete turnaround in climate policy. But it 
means that new governments want to leave a clear political mark by distancing themselves 
from predecessors. This could potentially result in planning uncertainties. It remains to be 
seen whether Baden-Wuerttemberg’s new approach proves able to overcome this short-
termism by means of a climate protection law and the creation of independent bodies for 
keeping the issue on the agenda and monitoring the strategy’s progress. This would imply 
that legally self-binding of governments could enhance the so far limited strategies. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions: Options for more ambitious climate poli-
cy integration 
Strategies are supposedly a means to initiate comprehensive governing processes suitable 
for tack-ling long-term problems. As such, they have to be more than single documents or 
declarations of intent. On the contrary, strategic processes involving all relevant actors 
and strategic capacity ensuring impact and effectiveness are at least as important for tar-
get achievement (Jacob et al. 2012). However, achievements in German climate mitigation 
policy, conceived as the adoption of instruments suitable to bringing about GHG emissions 
reductions, cannot be attributed to strategies only. Our findings illustrate that horizontal 
coordination is rather based upon turf wars leading to lowest common denominator deci-




operation is virtually inexistent, resulting in a certain degree of incoherence of policy ac-
tivities from different governmental levels. Progress can rather be explained by reference 
to high public pressure, party constellations in government coalitions, individual prefer-
ences of leaders, or external circumstances and in particular international and European 
developments. In light of the enormous challenge posed by climate change, these patterns 
are not sufficient to ensure that climate mitigation policy continues on the chosen track 
and achieves long-term GHG emissions reduction targets.  
This sheds light on remaining gaps in existing climate mitigation strategies, especially at 
the federal level. We argue that this is a result of gaps in terms of strategy processes and 
capacities. The problem of climate change has been described extensively, requirements 
for action have long been identified, and medium and long-term GHG reduction targets 
have been set. However, problems arise when it comes to the formulation of measures and 
their actual implementation, i.e. during the legislative process. Strategies have to provide 
for mechanisms that ensure the integration of long-term visions in everyday policymaking, 
when competing interests and worldviews clash against each other. On the basis of our in-
terviews, we argue that such mechanisms in German climate mitigation strategies can be 
grouped into three categories: institutionalization, codification, and participation. 
Institutionalization is a means to enhance both the quality of the process of a strategy and 
its capacity. Coordination bodies at administrative and political level can ensure proper 
implementation and, if necessary, strategy adjustment. Inter-ministerial cooperation at 
administrative level could be coordinated by a management body like the LSK in Hamburg 
and Baden-Wuerttemberg. In any case, the relation to the existing and constitutionally 
agreed decision making in government and parliament would need clarification. The source 
of legitimacy could be evidence on potentials and achievements in GHG reductions and 
hence independence in commissioning studies and monitoring would be required. Ideally, 
representatives from Länder administrations would take part in such coordination group.  
At political level, a State Secretary Committee could initiate political dialogue between 
the various departments concerned with climate mitigation issues and characterized by 
competing interests. Such a “Green Cabinet” has been established for Germany’s Sustaina-
ble Development Strategy (SDS) – a governance mechanism widely acknowledged for its 
high degree of innovation (e.g. Pisano et al. 2013, p. 9). Such a central political steering 
committee for Germany’s climate mitigation policy could ensure continuous dialogue and 
strategy updating. Another possibility would be the creation of a federal ministry for envi-
ronment, climate and energy matters, as in Baden-Wuerttemberg. However, interviewees 
were skeptical about the integrating effect of such a step. Conflicts would not automati-
cally disappear when all involved stakeholders are permanently brought together under 
one roof. Thus, the creation of a committee composed of high-ranking officials from all 
relevant ministries might be an equally effective solution that does not require difficult 
and timely restructuring of responsibilities. Furthermore, strategies should institutionalize 
regular monitoring and evaluation to enable learning processes. Coordination units like the 
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LSK could perform a monitoring function by assembling information on the implementation 
statuses of measures and their impacts. Another option would be the assignment of re-
sponsibility for periodic evaluation to independent actors. Again, Germany has gained ex-
perience with peer reviews carried out by international experts when it evaluated its SDS 
in 2009 and 2013 (Stigson et al. 2009, Stigson et al. 2013). All of these institutional innova-
tions ensure that relevant public actors are continuously involved in the different stages of 
a strategy process, resulting in proper implementation and early recognition of necessary 
adjustments, thus enhancing strategic capacity. While such mechanisms would not neces-
sarily guarantee effectiveness in achieving a CPI, they would at least keep up the momen-
tum of strategy processes.  
Codification is a further means to increase strategic capacity. A climate protection law 
with general and sector-specific targets is primarily a self-commitment. Even though this 
precludes suability, it can represent more than symbolic policy. For instance, periodic 
monitoring and evaluation could be prescribed by the law, thereby contributing that cli-
mate change mitigation remains on the agenda and continuous strategy updating takes 
place. One could even think of sanctioning options prescribed by the law, similar as in EU 
legislation. For instance, the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) requires re-
submission of National Action Plans when interim targets for the share of renewables in a 
country’s energy mix are not achieved. Accordingly, sector-specific action plans could be 
prescribed by a climate protection law. These action plans would have to be updated when 
sector-specific targets are not achieved until they are met. Finally, a federal climate pro-
tection law could emphasize the need for vertical CPI and coherence. Even though the 
constitutional division of responsibilities is hard to be changed, it could contain appeals to 
regional governments to contribute to climate change mitigation within their areas of re-
sponsibility, and offer assistance with regard to enforcement or advisory services. Within 
Germany, the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg take on a pio-
neering role with their climate protection laws adopted in 2013. Other states and the fed-
eral level might well benefit from first experiences with these laws. 
Finally, extended participation is potentially a key to a strategy’s process dimension. So 
far, strategies have mostly relied on classical inter-ministerial coordination in line with the 
joint rules of procedure. External involvement mainly happened through hearings of asso-
ciations. However, new modes of participation enable involvement of a wider range of in-
terested stakeholders. For instance, the EU Commission frequently carries out online con-
sultation procedures on concepts that tackle specific or general problem contexts. Baden-
Wuerttemberg has equally tried to involve as many interested actors as possible in its cur-
rent process of strategy formulation. Another option would be the set-up of an independ-
ent Advisory Council on Climate Protection to give the issue more visibility, contribute new 
ideas and impulses, and perform a watchdog function. With its SDS, Germany has already 
gained experience with such a body composed of actors from society, industry and aca-




All these possible innovation in enhancing the process and capacities of strategies are not a 
guarantee for effective integration and coherence as the example of national strategies for 
sustainable development has shown. Policies need to be developed and legitimized in the 
existing institutional apparatus. But the potentials of strategies are so far underutilized in 
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 Annex: List of interviewees 




1 Harald Kohl 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Na-




2 Annegret Niehuss 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Tech-
nology (BMWi) 
By phone, 13 
February 
3 Wolfgang Ornth 
Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and 
Urban development (BMVBS) 
Berlin, 20 
February 
4 Harry Lehmann Federal Environment Agency (UBA) 
Berlin, 18 
February 
5 Julia Reuss CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group 
Berlin, 18 
February 
6 Frank Schwabe 
Member of Parliament, SPD spokesperson 
on climate policy 
Berlin, 15 
March 
7 Ralf Sitte SPD Parliamentary Group 
Berlin, 4 
March 
8 Christian Hey 
Secretary General of the German Advisory 
Council on the Environment (SRU) 
Berlin, 26 
February 
9 Martin Bornholdt 
Deutsche Unternehmensinitiative Energie-
effizienz e.V. (DENEFF) 
By phone, 6 
February 








Christine Wolf, Sibylle 
Hepting-Hug, Jürgen 
Gaus 
Ministry of State 
Stuttgart, 10 
April 
13 Martin Eggstein 
Ministry of the Environment, Climate Pro-
tection and the Energy Sector, Baden-
Wuerttemberg 





14 Karl Greißing 
Ministry of the Environment, Climate Pro-




15 Ulrich Müller 




16 Volker Kienzlen 
Climate Protection and Energy Agency, 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (KEA) 
By phone, 17 
April 
Hamburg 
17 Friederike Mechel 
State Ministry for Urban Development and 
the Environment, Hamburg 
Hamburg, 18 
April 
18 Benno Hain 
Hamburg Coordination Centre for Climate 
Issues (LSK) 
By phone, 16 
April 
19 Rainer Scheppelmann 




20 Jens Kerstan Chairman oft he GAL Parliamentary Group 
Hamburg, 18 
April 
21 Monika Schaal 
SPD Parliamentary Group, Spokesperson 
for environmental policy 
By phone, 23 
April 
22 Manfred Braasch Friends of the Earth Hamburg (BUND) 
Hamburg, 18 
April 
23 One interviewee wants to remain anonymous. 
 
 
 
